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A SURVEY OF THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
INTRODUCTION
Legal literature was inundated with articles, notes and comments on the
subject of organ transplantation during the year of 1968. The catalyst for
this seemingly sudden and fad-like interest in the subject was the perform-
ance of the first human heart transplant on December 3, 1967. Over the
past six years there have been significant legal developments in this area,
as the law has adapted to meet changing medical and social needs. This
comment will present a survey of the current status of the significant legal
aspects of organ transplantation, and suggested approaches to related prob-
lems in terms of both litigation and client counseling. The topics to be
examined are 1) donor consent, 2) the execution of anatomical gifts, 3) the
legal concept of death and 4) contract or tort liability for activities relating
to organ transplantation. The material presented is not intended to consti-
tute an exhaustive analysis of each topic. Rather, a survey approach is
employed in order to outline and comment upon the current status of this
area of the law.
CONSENT
Live Donors in General
It is basic medical jurisprudence that prior to the performance of any
surgical procedure, consent to that procedure must be obtained from the
patient. One of the most frequently quoted statements of this proposition
is one by Justice Cardozo:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon
who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an
assault, for which he is liable in damages.'
The following discussion of donor consent is limited to transplant procedures
in which living donors are utilized. 2 Certain transplant procedures, such as
kidney transplants or skin grafts, may be performed utilizing living donors.
The application to organ transplantation is limited to kidney transplants, as
1. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92,
93 (1919). See also W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 18 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER].
2. For a discussion of donative problems in procedures which utilize cadaver
donors, see the section on EXECUTION OF ANATOMICAL GIFTS.
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it is presently inconceivable that any vital organ other than the kidney
might be removed from a living donor for the purpose of transplantation.3
If the hospital and physician are to protect themselves from tort liability
for the removal of a kidney from a living donor, it is necessary to obtain not
only the donor's express consent, but also his informed consent. The doc-
trine of informed consent concerns the duty of the physician to inform the
patient of the risks that may be involved in the surgery. 4 Informed consent
may act as a limitation on express consent in that the latter is valid only to
the extent that the patient has a clear understanding of the surgical proce-
dure and the risks that are involved.5
There has been considerable discussion as to whether an action based on
the absence of informed consent should be framed in battery or negligence. 6
The prevailing view is that a tort action which alleges lack of informed con-
sent is based on negligence for the physician's failure to conform to a proper
standard. This standard is to be determined on the basis of expert testimony
as to what disclosures should be made.7 The minority view is that the con-
sent is vitiated and therefore the basis of liability is battery."
No Illinois cases refer to the concept of informed consent. However,
it would be inaccurate to conclude that a tort action based on lack of in-
formed consent would be without legal basis in Illinois because it may be
brought in the form of a negligence action. The gravamen of such an ac-
tion lies in the physician's failure to conform to a reasonable standard as to
disclosures, rather than in an intentional tortious act. Accordingly, the ma-
jority view seems to represent the more enlightened approach and would
most likely be adopted in Illinois. Unless there is evidence of "shocking"
and intentional misrepresentations which are unjustified, the plaintiff's com-
plaint should be primarily in negligence.
The existence of alternative bases of liability demonstrates the need
for caution by physicians and hospitals in performing even routine surgical
procedures. The incidence of death or serious complication in live trans-
plant donors having undergone the removal of one kidney (a unilateral
3. Hamburger and Crosneir, Moral and Ethical Problems in Transplantation, in
HUMAN TRANSPLANTATION 37 (Rapaport and Dausset ed. 1968); reviewed in Strunk
v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 35 A.L.R.3d 683 (Ky. 1969).
4. PROSSER, § 32.
5. See Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958).
But cf. Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967).
6. See McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment,
41 MINN. L. REV. 381 (1957) for an excellent and thorough analysis of this distinc-
tion. This is also discussed more briefly in Comment, Informed Consent as a Theory
of Medical Liability, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 879 (1970).
7. Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d
299 (Tex. 1967); PROSSER, § 32.
8. See Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1967);
Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 223 A.2d 663 (1966); Belcher v. Carter, 13 Ohio
App. 2d 113, 234 N.E.2d 311 (1967).
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nephrectomy) are infrequent. Accordingly, it is considered to be a low risk
procedure.9 Nonetheless, the donor must be made aware of all possible risks
if the requirements of informed consent are to be met.
In Hart v. Brown,10 the Superior Court of Connecticut received expert
testimony as to the nature of the possible risks to the donor in such a surgi-
cal procedure. The following material points from that testimony and cur-
rent medical opinion are suggested as examples of the nature of the in-
formation that must be disclosed to the donor, and which the donor must un-
derstand, in order to satisfy the requirement of informed consent." At the
time of the Hart decision, it was revealed that there was only one reported
death in 3,000 recorded kidney transplants utilizing live donors, and even
this death may have been from causes unrelated to the procedure. Cur-
rently, about 5,000 live donor transplants have been performed with prob-
ably no more than two donor deaths.12  The testimony in Hart also stated
that the operation would last about two and one half hours, and that the
post operative pain would be no greater than in a more routine surgical
procedure. Furthermore, the testimony indicated that the period of hospital-
ization would be about eight days, and a donor could usually resume normal
activities in thirty days. It is also noteworthy that the testimony in Hart,
indicated that the risk to the donor was such that life insurance actuaries
would not rate the donor higher than individuals with two kidneys. The
donor should also be informed that there is always some possibility of post
operative complications, which if serious enough, may require further sur-
gery. 3  In all situations the physician and hospital administrator should be
aware of the legal requirements of informed consent in order to insure that
valid consent is obtained from the donor.
Live Donors, Infants and Incompetents
The requirement of consent to the unilateral nephrectomy on the live
donor is more problematic when the donor is legally incapable of giving
consent because of minority14 or mental deficiency. This is because in few
9. Interview with Dr. Frederick Merkel, Director of The Section of Transplan-
tation of Rush Presbyterian St.-Luke's Medical Center, in Chicago, Oct. 10, 1973.
See Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Sup. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972).
10. 29 Conn. Sup. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972).
-11. The question of obtaining valid consent from the recipient is based on the
general legal principles that have been presented. Specific consideration of the process
of "informing" the recipient is not included because that process is an inseparable part
of each individual doctor-patient relationship, which is established over a long period
of time; and an analysis of that relationship is not within the scope of this comment.
12. Interview with Dr. Frederick Merkel, supra note 9.
13. Id.
14. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91, § 18.1 (1971) provides:
The consent to the performance of a medical or surgical procedure by a
physician ...executed by a married person who is a minor, by a pregnant
woman who is a minor, or by any person 18 years of age or older, is not
voidable because of such minority, and, for such purpose, . . . is deemed to
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states is there clear precedent which indicates that a parent or guardian has
the power to consent (for the donor) to a surgical procedure which is for
the therapeutic benefit of someone other than the donor. In the two leading
cases that have dealt with this problem it was determined that under the
powers of equity, courts have the power to authorize the parents or guardian
of the donor to consent to the procedure.' 5
Strunk v. Strunk"6 is a Kentucky case involving two brothers, aged 28
and 27. The latter was an incompetent, having a mental age of 6 years.
The 28 year old was mentally competent, but was suffering from chronic
renal disease. Medically, the most desirable course of treatment was the
performance of a kidney transplant using the incompetent brother as the
donor. The mother of the family filed a petition in equity seeking authority
to give consent to the surgical procedure for the incompetent donor. The
court relied on the doctrine of substituted judgment to establish its chan-
cery power to authorize the parent to consent to the procedure. The doc-
trine of substituted judgment concerns the inherent powers of equity to act
for an incompetent in the same manner as the incompetent would have acted
if he had his faculties. The doctrine, as applied in Strunk, is broad enough
to cover not only property matters, but also all other matters touching
the well being of the legally incapacitated person. Accordingly, the holding
of Strunk was based primarily, not on a consideration of what would be most
beneficial to the recipient. The court instead found that the maintenence of
the life of the incompetent's brother was in the best interest of the incompe-
tent to such an extent as to warrant the removal of one of the latter's kid-
neys for that purpose.' 7
A similar problem was presented to a Connecticut court in Hart v.
Brown,' s except that the donor's incapacity to consent arose from infancy
rather than mental deficiency. The parents of two seven year old twin girls
brought an action for declaratory judgment as to their authority to con-
sent to the removal of a kidney from the healthy twin for the purpose of
have the same legal capacity to act and has the same powers and obligations
as has a person of legal age.
15. See generally Curran, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantation in Mi-
nors, 34 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 891 (1959). During the week of November 27, 1973, a live
donor kidney transplant between fifteen year old twin girls was performed in a Chicago,
Illinois hospital. At the request of the hospital, court approval was obtained prior to
the performance of the operation. Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 24, 1973, at 26, col. 2.
16. 445 S.W.2d 145, 35 A.L.R.3d 683 (Ky. 1969).
17. In Strunk, there was expert psychiatric testimony that there would be an ex-
treme traumatic effect on the incompetent brother if this, his only brother or sister,
died. Similarly, a review of the decree in Children's Memorial Hospital v. Lewis, No.
73 CH6936, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois (Nov. 21, 1973) (discussed in
note 15, supra) indicates that there the court based its conclusion, in part, on a finding
that there would be "grave emotional impact" on the donor if her sister died, and
that when all facts were considered, it appeared that the potential benefit to the donor
from the operation outweighed the potential dangers.
18. 29 Conn. Sup. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972).
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transplantation into the other. 19 As in Strunk, the court relied on the equit-
able doctrine of substituted judgment as the basis for the authority to act in
this area. The court noted, however, that before it would authorize the
parents to consent, it must be established that the need is urgent, the prob-
abilities of success are most favorable, and the duty is clear.20  The court
also received psychiatric testimony that indicated that the donor had a strong
identification with her twin sister and that if the transplant was successful,
there would be an immense benefit to the donor in terms of her family life
and the avoidance of the very great loss in the death of her sister. The donor
had been informed of the proposed transplant, and, insofar as she was
capable of understanding, she desired to donate her kidney. The court held
that the parents were authorized to consent to the removal of a kidney of the
healthy twin for the transplant.2 1
These two cases, three unreported Massachusetts cases22 (which are in
accord with Hart) and the recent Illinois case noted in footnote 17 are
among the few American decisions dealing with the specific question of whe-
ther a parent or guardian may consent to non-therapeutic surgery on the
donor who lacks legal capacity to give consent, when that surgery is for the
therapeutic benefit of another. Aside from the paucity of precedent on this
particular question, there is an absence of any cases in which, unlike
Strunk and Hart, there is an interested party or an expert witness testifying
that the proposed transplant would not be in the best interest of the donor.
This suggests that the legal practitioner should advise the physician client
not to rely upon the consent of a parent or guardian of a donor legally in-
capable of consenting, unless it has been specifically authorized by a court.
Since the transplant is not an emergency surgical procedure, there would
usually be no requirement of immediacy which would make declaratory pro-
ceedings impractical.
THE EXECUTION OF ANATOMICAL GIFTS-CADAVER DONORS
Background
The procurement of kidneys for transplantation can be effected from
both living and cadaver donors while vital organs such as the heart, liver
or lungs can only be procured from cadaver donors. This section concerns
transplants from cadaver donors and the problems involved when a donor
wishes to execute an anatomical gift to take effect upon his death.
19. The twin requiring the transplant had already undergone a bilateral nephrec-
tomy and was being kept alive by undergoing frequent hemodialysis treatments.
20. Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Sup. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972).
21. Cf. Bonner v. Moran, 75 U.S. App. D.C. 156, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
22. The following three unreported cases are reviewed in Curran, supra note 15:
Masden v. Harrison, No. 68651, Eq. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. (June 12, 1957); Hushey v.
Harrison, No. 68666 Eq. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. (Aug. 30, 1957); Foster v. Harrison, No.
68674, Eq. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. (Nov. 20, 1957). These cases are all in accord with
Hart.
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In early English common law, no property rights were recognized in a
dead body. This "no-property" doctrine was exemplified in Williams v.
Williams.23 There the English Court concluded that since a body is not
property, it could not be part of the decedent's estate; thus, a person could
not direct the manner of his burial. 24 Although this doctrine was originally
adopted in early decisions in this country, 25 some courts reduced its effects
by recognizing that an individual has a "quasi-property" interest in his body.
Even though this provided some basis for allowing a person to direct the
post mortem disposition of his body, frequent departures in its application
resulted in only qualified assurances that a decedent's desires would be fol-
lowed in the absence of statutory authority. Furthermore, the chances of the
fulfillment of the decedent's desires were greatly lessened if the decedent's
intent was to donate his body for scientific or medical purposes. 26
In the past thirty years, varying statutes had been enacted in over forty
states and the District of Columbia which permitted post mortem donations
of all or part of the body for medical, scientific or therapeutic purposes.
These statutes had little uniformity and most authorities concluded that the
diversity and confusion in common law and statutory enactments resulted in
the law being inadequate in matters relating to organ transplantation. One
commentator summarized this situation as follows:
These statutes represent a fundamental departure from the com-
mon law which did not provide this authority. Although a consid-
erable improvement, the existing donation statutes, for the most
part, have failed to fill the void left by both common law and
those statutes relating to autopsies, unclaimed bodies, and medical
examiners. . . . First, many important issues are either overlooked
or ignored. The result is an uncertainty which restricts those
physicians and scientists who work under the most severe time
restrictions. Second, most donation statutes have failed to recog-
nize the unique demands of organ and tissue donation. All too
frequently the act of donating has been viewed merely as an ex-
tension of the testamentary disposition of property, an approach
which has produced unnecessary formality and rigidity. 27
In 1965, in response to these legislative shortcomings, the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws created a special committee to draft a uniform donation
statute. The result was the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.
23. 20 Ch. Div. 659 (1882).
24. Sadler and Sadler, Transplantation and The Law: The Need For Organized
Sensitivity, 57 GEo. L.J. 5 (1968).
25. E.g., Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 63 P. 170 (1900).
26. Sadler and Sadler, supra note 24. See also Featherstone, The Uniform Ana-
tomical Gift Act, The Law's Approach To A Human Need, 110 TRusrs & ESTATES
468 (1971).
27. Sadler and Sadler, supra note 24, at 18.
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The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 28 was approved by the National Con-
ference on Uniform Laws and by the American Bar Association in July, 1968.
The Act was intended to be a model donation statute which when adopted
by the states would promote a favorable environment for the donation of an
individual's body for the purpose of transplantation or other medical or scien-
tific ends. 29 The Act had been adopted with only minor changes by thirty-
nine states and the District of Columbia in 1969. By the end of 1971, the
remaining eleven states had adopted the Act in some form.3 0
Under the Act, any person of sound mind and over eighteen years of
age3 l may make a gift of all or any part of his body to take effect upon
death. The Act provides that the surviving next of kin may (according to
an enumerated order of priority) execute an anatomical gift of the body of
the deceased so long as there is no notice of a contrary intention by the de-
cedent, or opposition from a member of the same or a superior class of sur-
vivors.32 An important effect of this provision that logically follows is that
a parent or other appropriate survivor of a deceased minor can execute an
anatomical gift, even though the decedent minor would have been unable to
do so himself.
The greatest degree of uniformity between states exists in the section of
the Act dealing with the question of who may be a donee and for what pur-
poses the gift may be made. Generally, an anatomical gift may be made to
physicians, hospitals, teaching institutions, storage banks or to a specified
individual for the purpose of transplantation, therapy, teaching or research. 33
Another section which has been adopted with an exceptional degree of uni-
formity is that which prescribes the manner in which the gift may be exe-
cuted.3 4 According to this provision, an anatomical gift may be executed by
a will, in which case the gift is to become effective immediately upon the
death of the testator without having to wait for probate. Furthermore, even
if the will is not probated or is declared invalid for testamentary purposes,
the gift is valid and effective to the extent that it has been acted upon in
good faith.
In addition to execution by will, the gift may be made by another prop-
erly signed document or card. The latter is usually designed to be carried on
28. The Illinois Uniform Anatomical Gift Act became effective on Oct. 1, 1969.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 551-61 (1971).
29. Featherstone, supra note 26.
30. Capron and Kass, A Statutory Definition of The Standards For Determining
Death: An Appraisal and A Proposal, 121 U. oF PA. L. REV. 87 (1972) at 101.
31. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3 § 553(a) (1971) requires that the donor executing the
anatomical gift be of sound mind and be an "adult."
32. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL G=r Act § 2. (Hereinafter cited as ACT).
33. ACT § 3. See also Featherstone, supra note 26.
34. ACT § 4.
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the person of the donor and is very helpful to insure the carrying out the
wishes of the donor in accident situations where the time limitations are
great. If no donee is named in the document, the attending physician may
accept the gift. If a donee is specified, but is not available at the time of
death, the attending physician may accept as the agent of the donee. The
provision for the use of written instruments such as these is desirable in
that it allows for a fulfillment of the donor's intentions in a flexible manner
by which the necessity for adherence to technicalities involved in drafting
wills is eliminated. The document or card must be signed by the donor
in the presence of two witnesses who must also sign in the presence of
the donor. Delivery of the document is not a prerequisite to the validity of
the gift. It is further provided that the next of kin may execute a gift by a
telegraphic, recorded telephonic or other recorded message. As with the
card carried by the donor, these provisions expedite the procedures where
time is limited.
The Act provides that if the will or other written instrument has been
delivered, a revocation may be executed by a signed writing or an oral state-
ment made in the presence of two witnesses. The revocation may also be
effectuated by a statement made to the attending physician during a terminal
illness or injury, or by a signed card found on the donor or among his ef-
fects. These methods may be used for amendment of the gift, as well as for
revocation, and in either case the change must be communicated to the donee.
The Act does not specify the exact means by which this communication is to
be effected, however, it seems to imply a requirement of actual notice. A
testamentary gift may also be amended or revoked in the same manner pro-
vided for amendment or revocation of wills in the adopting state.3 5  Illi-
nois varies significantly from other jurisdictions in the requirements for
amendments or revocation. In Illinois changing a delivered gift, made by
document other than a will, requires the same formality of witnesses and
certification as was necessary for its execution. Also, the Illinois statute
does not contain a provision for alteration orally or through the attending
physician during a terminal illness.3 6
The Act further provides that a physician or other person who acts in
good faith in accordance with the terms of the Act is protected from civil
or criminal liability.37 Finally, after the removal of the part of the body
being donated, custody of the remainder of the body vests in the surviving
spouse, next of kin or others under an obligation to dispose of the body.38
In Illinois, and many other jurisdictions, there are no reported decisions
concerning the Act. At first blush, two possible conclusions are suggested
from this empirical observation. First, one may get the impression that the
35. ACT § 6.
36. Featherstone, supra note 26, at 469; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3 § 557 (1971).
37. ACT § 7(c).
38. ACT § 7(a).
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provisions of the Act are rarely relied upon. A second conclusion that is
suggested is that the Act is relied upon, but its effectiveness in providing
a favorable and workable environment for organ and tissue donation has re-
sulted in a paucity of litigation. That the latter is the more accurate conclu-
sion is indicated by the ever increasing number of organ and tissue trans-
plants being performed. Therefore, from a client counseling standpoint, the
Act represents an effective statutory tool which the attorney may utilize to in-
sure that the desires of his client are fully realized.
The provisions of the Act pertain to anatomical gifts which are to take
effect upon death. The Act makes no attempt to define the uncertain point
in time when life terminates and death is said to have occurred. It is neces-
sary, therefore, to explore the current status of the law relating to the con-
cept of death.
THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF DEATH
The Nature of the Problem
On September 10, 1973, Samuel M. Allen was shot in the head in Oak-
land, California. Allen was pronounced dead at a hospital after his brain
showed no electric activity. He was unresponsive to stimula, had no re-
flexes and had no spontaneous respiration. Allen's heart was kept beating
by artificial means before it was removed, flown to Stanford University Hos-
pital and transplanted into a recipient there. Andrew D. Lyons, who al-
legedly shot Allen, was charged with murder. In a pre-trial proceeding, the
defendant's attorney argued that Lyons should not stand trial for murder
because the victim's heart was still beating when it was removed and there-
fore, the victim was still alive. On October 5, 1973, after two days of
medical and police testimony, the defendant was ordered to stand trial for
murder.39
The question to be determined in this case is: When is a person legally
dead? There is a dearth of legal answers to this question though a precise
39. Chicago Daily News, Oct. 6, 1973, at 8, col. 3. This ruling must be com-
pared to a recent contrary ruling in another pending California criminal prosecution,
People v. Flores, No. 20190, Sonoma County Municipal Court. Flores caused an auto-
mobile accident by driving on the wrong side of the road while intoxicated. As a
result of the accident a twelve year old girl was severely injured and brought to a hos-
pital. At the hospital she was pronounced dead on the basis of cessation of brain
function, although her cardiac function had been maintained artificially. Her heart
was donated and removed for transplantation purposes. At a preliminary hearing on
December 5, 1973, a manslaughter charge against Flores was dismissed on a judge's
ruling that the girl died from the transplant operation and not from the injuries sus-
tained in the accident. It is unclear whether the ruling was based on a legal finding
(rejection of a brain death standard for determining death) or on a factual finding
(a brain death standard is acceptable, but the standard was not met). This very im-
portant point should be clarified when the ruling is reviewed. Telephone interview
with Stephen Tucker, Deputy District Attorney of Sonoma County, California, Dec.
10, 1973; Chicago Tribune, Dec. 6, 1973, § 2, at 9, col. 3.
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answer is needed. The process of organ transplantation from cadaver donors
requires a precise determination of the instant of death of the donor.
Before considering the law's approach to this problem, it is helpful to
review the recent medical developments that have caused this deficiency in
the law. Traditionally, both medical and legal definitions of death have
been associated with the cessation of heartbeat and respiration which has
been termed "clinical death." However, modem medical techniques and
machines, such as the respirator and the electric pacesetter, have enabled
physicians to artifically maintain a patient's heartbeat and respiration thereby
postponing clinical death. However, medical science has found no way to
maintain the brain function, the complete failure of which (irreversible
coma) has been termed "brain death."
Application of the clinical death standard would require the cessation
of circulation in the donor before the surgeon could remove the organ. At
this point the organ would have already begun to deteriorate, consequently,
reducing significantly the probability of a successful transplant. However,
the application of the brain death standard would allow for removal of the
organ even though the circulation is being maintained artificially, thus en-
hancing the likelihood of a successful transplant.40  Accordingly, the case
just presented concerns the situation in which the victim had sustained brain
death and spontaneous respiration and heartbeat had ceased, but the latter
had been maintained artificially before the removal of his heart for the
purpose of transplantation. The central issue is to determine at precisely
what point the patient was dead.
The Legal Definition of Death
The classic definition of death that has been developed through case
law is reflected in the following entry in Black's Law Dictionary:
The cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians
as the total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessation
of the animal and vital functions consequent thereon, such as res-
piration, pulsation, etc.41
In the 1968 California case of In Re Schmidt,42 the question of the criteria for
determining the instant of death arose because of a factual question of
simultaneous death. The court cited and applied the above definition.
Moreover, the testimony regarding irreversible coma was presented by ex-
pert witnesses, but categorically rejected. In the 1958 case of Smith v.
Smith,43 which also involved simultaneous death, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas adopted verbatim, the above quoted definition of death. Thus,
40. Comment, The Criteria For Determining Death in Vital Organ Transplants-
A Medico-Legal Dilemma, 38 Mo. L. REv. 220, 224 (1973).
41. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 488 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
42. 261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 67 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1968).
43. 229 Ark. 579, 317 S.W.2d 275 (1958).
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many courts have come to rely on this definition in determining when death
occurs for purposes other than transplantation. 44 Some courts have gone as
far as to specifically reject the cessation of brain activity as an additional cri-
tenion of death.45
Although the traditional criteria for determining death (the clinical
death standard) may have been adequate for the resolution of cases involv-
ing issues such as simultaneous death, the application of that definition to
the process of organ transplantation is unrealistic and inappropriate. If the
clinical death standard is applied, transplant surgeons are vulnerable to
both civil and criminal liability, not to mention the chilling effect that such
a standard would have on the execution of anatomical gifts and on the re-
search and development in this field of surgical science.
The first and, to date, the only decided case in which the question of a
definition of death was presented in the context of organ transplantation was
the Virginia case of Tucker v. Lower.46  This case involved a wrongful
death action against doctors on the Medical College of Virginia transplant
team, which had been brought by the brother of a decedent whose heart
was removed on May 25, 1968 and used in the world's seventeenth human
heart transplant operation. One of the claims was that the operation was
commenced before his brother had died. The decedent was admitted to the
hospital with severe head injuries. After a neurological operation, he was
placed on a respirator. Later it was determined that he had sustained brain
death and the respirator was turned off. When the case was sent to the
jury, the judge included instructions that allowed the jury to consider all
possible causes of death, including injury to the brain, and cessation of
breathing or cessation of heartbeat. The jury returned a verdict for the de-
fendants. 47
Since transplant operations do not usually result in litigation it seems
unlikely that case law will be able to provide a more modem definition of
death which is supportive of new trends in medical science. A statutory
definition of death is the more desirable approach in that it would allow for
a wider range of information to enter into the framing of the criteria for
determining death. Legislation will not remove the need for reasoned in-
terpretation by physicians and judges, but it can restrict the scope of their
interpretations to that which has been found acceptable by the public.48
44. See Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d 371, 215 P.2d 478 (1950); United
Trust v. Pyke, 199 Kan. 1, 427 P.2d 67 (1967); Schmitt v. Pierce, 344 S.W.2d 120
(Mo. 1961).
45. See Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. App. 1952). A good discussion
of cases, not involving organ transplantation, but which have rejected brain death as
a standard for determining the instant of death can be found in the Comment cited
in note 40. See also Vaegemast v. Hess, 203 Minn. 207, 280 N.W. 641 (1938).
46. Tucker v. Lower, No. 2831, Richmond Va., L. & Eq. Ct. (May 23, 1972).
Discussion of this case may be found in Capron and Kass, supra note 30, at 98.
47. Capron and Kass, supra note 30, at 99.
48. Id. at 101.
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The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act provides only that the time of death
shall be determined by the physician attending the donor at his death. It
further states that this physician shall not participate in the procedures for
removing or transplanting the part.49 The drafters concluded that it would
be inappropriate to incorporate a definition of death because this was con-
sidered to be primarily a medical question.5 0 This approach ignores the
existing conflict between current medical practice and the present law. This
conflict must be eliminated if the other provisions of the Act are to have their
full intended effect on the science of organ transplantation.
The Act does not preclude a state which has adopted it from enact-
ing legislation dealing more specifically with the determination of death.
Although there are technical determinations which should remain within
the judgment of the physician, the law must provide a flexible framework
of criteria which is supportive of those determinutions in light of medical ad-
vances.
[I]f legislators approach the issues with a critical and inquiring
attitude, a statutory "definition" of death may be the best way
to resolve the conflicting needs for definiteness and flexibility, for
public involvement and scientific accuracy. 51
This suggests that the legislation defining death should be neither overly
general, nor highly specific.
Kansas, Maryland and Virginia are the only states which have en-
acted legislation which provides a definition of death.52  These statutes,
49. ACT § 7(b). The rational for this provision is to prevent potential conflict
of interest situations that might otherwise confront the transplant surgeon.
50. Sadler and Sadler, supra note 24, at 26. But see Comment, Human Organ
Transplantation: Some Medico-Legal Pitfalls For Transplant Surgeons, 23 U. OF FLA.
L. REv. 134 (1970) at 150, in which the author suggests that it is puzzling that the
Act paid such little attention to this problem, and that this was the crippling aspect
of the Act.
51. Capron and Kass, supra note 30, at 101.
52. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 54f (Cum.
Supp. 1972); CODE OF VA. ch. 19.2 § 32-364.3:1 (1973 Cum. Supp.). The following
is the text of the Maryland statute:(a) A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, based
on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence of spon-
taneous respiratory and cardiac function and, because of the disease or condi-
tion which caused, directly or indirectly, these functions to cease, or because
of the passage of time since these functions ceased, attempts at resuscitation
are considered hopeless; and, in this event, death will have occurred at the time
these functions ceased; or(b) A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the
opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice and
because of a known disease or condition, there is the absence of spontaneous
brain function; and if based on ordinary standards of medical practice, during
reasonable attempts to either maintain or restore spontaneous circulatory or
respiratory function in the absence of spontaneous brain function, it appears
that further attempts at resuscitation or supportive maintenance will not
succeed, death will have occurred at the time when these conditions first co-
incide. Death is to be pronounced before artificial means of supporting
respiratory and circulatory function are terminated and before any vital organ
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which are practically identical, provide alternative definitions of death. The
first is based on an absence of spontaneous respiration and cardiac function.
The second is based on the absence of spontaneous brain function during
attempts to maintain or restore spontaneous circulatory or respiratory func-
tion. The latter alternative is clearly intended to be supportive of transplan-
tation processes in that it provides that death is to be pronounced before
artificial means of supporting respiratory and circulatory functions are term-
inated, and before any vital organ is removed for transplantation. At least
three commentators have criticized this dichotomy as being a misconception
in that if assumes that there are two separate phenomena of death. 3 It
seems arguable, however, that the statute is not based upon such an assump-
tion, but rather simply provides alternative methods of determining when
death has occured in varying situations. The following alternative statute
has been proposed by one team of commentators who were critical of the
statute adopted by Kansas and Maryland:
A person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of
a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, he
has experienced an irreversible cessation of spontaneous respira-
tory and circulatory functions. In the event that artificial means
of support preclude a determination that these functions have ceased,
a person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of
a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, he
has experienced an irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain
functions. Death will have occurred at the time when the rele-
vant functions ceased.54
Since statutes such as these are corollaries to the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act, they would seem to present a proper subject matter for a uniform law.
However, since the Act omits such a definition of death, it is the duty of the
individual states to examine varying proposals, such as those presented, and
to enact appropriate and timely legislation.
In the absence of such legislation and until the existing statutes are
supplemented by judicial interpretation, transplant centers, through their
physicians and attorneys, should establish a standard policy for determining
death in order to insure that the rights of the donor are fully protected.
Furthermore, the type of statutory definition of death that most jurisdictions
seem likely to adopt, if at all, is that which provides only a framework
within which the transplant center must establish and apply its own specific
policy for determining death. The presence of such a statute would not
make the physician and transplant center totally immune from civil (wrong-
ful death) or criminal liability. They still must conform to ordinary stand-
is removed for purposes of transplantation.(c) These alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for all pur-
poses in this State, including the trials of civil and criminal cases, any laws
to the contrary notwithstanding.
53. See Capron and Kass, supra note 30, at 108.
54. Id. at 111.
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ards of medical practice in determining death. Therefore, in all jurisdic-
tions, notwithstanding the presence of a statute, the attorney for the
transplant center and the physicians must provide the guidance for the de-
velopment of a policy for determining death which conforms to ordinary
standards of medical practice.
CONTRACT OR TORT LIABILITY FOR ACTIVITIES
RELATING To ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
Are the activities of a hospital in procuring, preserving or furnishing
an organ for transplantation, or in the performing of other activities relat-
ing to the organ which is to be used in a transplant operation, to be con-
strued as the "rendition of a service" or a "sale"? Under either construction,
the hospital is liable for negligence or for the breach of an express contrac-
tual obligation. Under the latter, however, the hospital would also be vul-
nerable to strict products liability in tort55 as well as liability based on im-
plied warranties in the sale.56 An analagous issue, which has been the
subject of much litigation and numerous commentaries, is the liability
of the hospital which furnishes blood that is defective in some way. The ma-
jority of case law on this question concludes that this does not constitute a
sale, but rather is a service. 57 However, transplant centers in most jurisdic-
tions do not have to rely only on an analogy with this line of decisions in
order to be protected from strict products liability, or liability based on
breach of implied warranties. In a majority of states, the legislatures have
enacted statutes which define activities relating to blood transfusions or
organ and tissue transplantation to be the rendition of a service.58
The history of Illinois' handling of this issue reveals a fundamental dis-
agreement between the Illinois Supreme Court and the Legislature in which
the latter has prevailed. The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts view of strict products liability in 1965 in Suvada v.
White Motors.59 Five years later, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a
hospital which supplied defective blood to a patient had made a sale
rather than performed a service; therefore, the hospital was subject to lia-
bility under a theory of strict products liability.60 Seven months after that
decision, in response thereto, the Illinois Legislature enacted a statute which
provided:
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402a (1965). For the Illinois doctrine
of products liability see Suvada v. White Motors, 32 Il!. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182
(1965).
56. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, § 2-315.
57. The leading case in this regard is Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y.
100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
58. See 48 CHm-KENT L. REV. 292, 296 (1971).
59. 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
60. Cunningham v. Mac Neal Memorial Hosp., 47 I11. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897
(1970).
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The procuring, furnishing, donating, processing, distributing or
using human whole blood, plasma, blood products, blood deriva-
tives and products, corneas, bones, or organs or other human tissue
for the purpose of injecting, transfusing or transplanting any of
them in the human body is declared for purposes of liability in
tort or contract to be the rendition of a service . . . and no war-
ranties of any kind or description nor strict tort liability shall be
applicable thereto .... 61
Illinois and many other jurisdictions have statutes which protect those en-
gaging in transplant activities from strict products liability or liability for
breach of implied warranties. Although there are varying policy considera-
tions to support both sides of the question of the extent of liability, this
statutory alternative seems to produce the more desirable result, for the proc-
ess of organ transplantation, from the standpoint of overall social utility.
Such a statute promotes the application and development of new medical
techniques in the delivery of health care.
According to the express provision in the Illinois statute, the physician
or transplant center warrants to the recipient of the services only that due
care has been exercised, and that professional standards of care in providing
the service, according to the current state of the medical arts, have been
followed. 62 Accordingly, the recipient plaintiff who is seeking damages for
an unsuccessful organ transplant must establish negligence on the part of
the named defendant(s). The practical effect of this is that unless the de-
fendant's departure from professional standards is clear and substantial, the
plaintiff will find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to sustain his bur-
den of proof on this point. This is because expert testimony will usually
be required to establish the breach of the duty of care and there are con-
siderable areas where medical experts will disagree. Furthermore, there
is a well known reluctance on the part of physicians to testify against one
another.68
If the plaintiff, notwithstanding these adversities, does proceed with such
an action, the physician and transplant center may be able to utilize a pro-
vision of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act in their defense. The Act pro-
vides that:
A person who acts in good faith in accord with the terms of the
Act . . . is not liable for damages in any civil action . ... 4
On its face, this provision suggests that there will be no liability even for
negligent acts, if performed in good faith. Absent other legislation which
provides for a warranty of due care, this provision arguably represents a bar
to the plaintiff's action unless there is a clear showing of bad faith. How-
61. ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 91, § 182 (1971).
62. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91, § 183 (1971).
63. PROSSEE, § 32.
64. ACT 7(c).
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ever, even if there is legislation which imposes a duty of due care on the
transplant center and physician, this provision may have the reverse effect
by showing that public policy is against such liability except in extreme cases.
The result of the operation of all these factors is that the physician and
transplant center are practically immune from civil liability for activities re-
lating to organ transplantation, unless there is a clear showing of an ex-
teme departure from professional standards of due care.
CONCLUSION
This survey has demonstrated how judicial decisions and legislative en-
actments have resulted in the development of the law to a state which is
supportive of the science of organ transplantation. This is one area of the
law which has, for the most part, been responsive to changing social needs.
The most significant legal aspect of organ transplantation which remains
under-developed is the concept of death. However, the emerging adoption
of a brain death standard in determining legal death is the means by which
this deficiency is being removed. This survery serves as a reminder that the
continuing explosion of technological advances both affects and is effected
by the law; a situation which strains the balance between stare decisis
and the need for responsive legal development.
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